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Introduction
IN NOVEMBER 2012, the United States lost, from resignation, its
CIA Director, General David Petraeus,1 one of the most decorated
generals in the U.S. Army.2 The chain of events leading to Petraeus’s
resignation also revealed the General’s extramarital affair with his bi-
ographer (and Army reservist), Paula Broadwell.3 During a criminal
investigation into Broadwell,4 the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) learned that the biographer previously sent anonymous
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1. Jennifer Epstein, Jonathan Allen & Josh Gerstein, Gen. David Petraeus Resigns as
CIA Director, Citing Affair, POLITICO (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
1112/83643.html.
2. See Biography of General David H. Petraeus, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.de
fense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=166 (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
3. Timeline of Petraeus Affair Scandal, FOX NEWS POLITICS (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www
.foxnews.com/politics/2012/11/13/timeline-petraeus-affair-scandal/; Samantha Gross-
man, Paula Broadwell, David Petraeus’ Biographer and Alleged Mistress, TIME (Nov. 12, 2012),
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/11/12/paula-broadwell-petraeus-biographer-and-al
leged-mistress/#ixzz2C2uWN6rq (explaining that Broadwell graduated from West Point
and has been recalled to active duty several times to focus on counterterrorism).
4. Richard Engel, Petraeus’ Biographer Paula Broadwell Under FBI Investigation over Access
to His Email, Law Enforcement Officials Say, NBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2012), http://usnews.nbc
news.com/_news/2012/11/09/15056607-petraeus-biographer-paula-broadwell-under-fbi-
investigation-over-access-to-his-email-law-enforcement-officials-say?lite.
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harassing e-mails to Jill Kelley, a Florida socialite who worked closely
with the U.S. Central Command military base in Tampa.5 Kelley initi-
ated the investigation of Broadwell when she allowed the government
access to an e-mail in her account in an attempt to find her harasser.6
This initial instance of consensual surveillance of a single e-mail even-
tually led to the investigation of at least four more individuals’ private
e-mail accounts without their knowledge.7 As a result of the surveil-
lance, the individuals suffered not only a tremendous loss of privacy,
but also sustained life-altering consequences.8 The Broadwell investi-
gation highlights the immense governmental power to search stored
e-mail content, the impact on the lives of those searched, and the
need for enhanced procedural safeguards on government
surveillance.9
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the Petraeus scan-
dal, describes the relevant players, and explains the consequences of
the government’s surveillance for each individual. Part II analyzes
three instances where the government’s access of electronic data dur-
ing the investigation raised privacy concerns: (1) when Jill Kelley vol-
untarily turned over her e-mails to the FBI; (2) when the FBI
identified Broadwell as Kelley’s pseudonymous e-mail harasser; and
(3) when the FBI discovered the e-mail account that Broadwell and
Petraeus used to communicate with each other. Each incident impli-
cates a different legal standard that law enforcement officials seeking
such electronic information must meet. More significantly, these inci-
dents reflect the relatively unchecked power of the government to ac-
cess private information without the knowledge or consent of the
user. The current regulatory scheme does not sufficiently rein in the
government’s surveillance power, and the Petraeus investigations
highlight a significant need for new legislation. This Comment offers
statutory solutions that Congress should implement to improve regu-
lation of government surveillance.
5. See Howard Kurtz, Jill Kelley Says Paula Broadwell Tried to ‘Blackmail’ Her, DAILY BEAST
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/22/jill-kelley-says-paula-
broadwell-tried-to-blackmail-her.html.
6. See Eric Schmitt & Elizabeth Bumiller, Another General Is Tied to the Petraeus Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/us/top-us-commander-
in-afghanistan-is-linked-to-petraeus-scandal.html?_r=0; Jill Kelley, How the Government Spied
on Me, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270
2303482504579179670250714560.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See id.; infra Part II.
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It is important to note that this Comment focuses on the need for
heightened procedural safeguards for surveillance of stored communica-
tions in criminal investigations. Surveillance of stored communications
differs from traditional surveillance methods that monitor targets in
real time—e.g. wiretaps and bugs—specifically with respect to notify-
ing a target that he or she has been surveilled. Traditionally, notifying
a target risked disrupting the investigation since the target could de-
stroy evidence. However, in the context of stored communications,
this risk becomes less serious, or even non-existent.10 In certain cir-
cumstances discussed in this Comment, the law requires investigators
to notify the target of stored communication surveillance. In practice,
investigators notify the user after gaining access to the communica-
tions from a third-party service provider, where the communication is
stored. Therefore, since investigators have already gained access to
the communications when the user is notified, there is no risk of the
user destroying such evidence. Additionally, the government can de-
lay notice to the user if it proves that the investigation will be compro-
mised.11 Further, it can obtain a preservation order requiring the
third-party service provider to save copies of stored communications12
to ensure that no content is lost prospectively.
I. Overview of the Scandal and the Consequences for Each
Player
The facts of the Petraeus scandal and the hardships suffered by
those involved illustrate the government’s immense and unchecked
surveillance power over stored e-mail content and should provide the
impetus for legislative change.
A. The Scandal
The media frenzy over Petraeus’s affair began with Jill Kelley,
Tampa socialite and honorary ambassador to the U.S. Central Com-
mand Coalition Forces.13 Kelley received an anonymous message in
10. See infra Part II.C.2.i for a response to concerns regarding giving notice of surveil-
lance in criminal investigations involving stored communications.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2012).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2012).
13. Michael Daly, Jill Kelley’s Campaign to Befriend Petraeus, Allen, and Other Top Brass,
DAILY BEAST (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/14/jill-kel
ley-s-campaign-to-befriend-petraeus-allen-and-other-top-brass.html. Kelley served as a social
liaison to the MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa and maintained close relationships with the
top commanders at Central Command, including General Petraeus and General Allen. Id.
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the Yahoo! e-mail account she shared with her husband.14 The sender
of the message, using the pseudonym “kelleypatrol,”15 allegedly sent
Kelley multiple troubling e-mails that contained threats, blackmail,
and extortion.16 Many speculated that jealousy surrounding Kelley’s
close relationship with General Petraeus sparked the barrage of e-
mails, but Kelley claimed she did not know the sender’s motivation.17
However, Kelley “knew [she] was being stalked”18 and felt threatened
enough to notify the FBI in May 2012.19 At that time, Kelley went to
her family friend, FBI Special Agent Frederick Humphries, who
brought the e-mails to the FBI cybercrime division.20 Investigators ex-
amined the e-mails and became concerned over language that indi-
cated the sender knew the travel plans and locations of both Petraeus
and the U.S. Commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen.21
When two congressmen and FBI director Robert Mueller learned of
the situation, they began an investigation to unmask kelleypatrol.22
Initially, the FBI examined every e-mail in Kelley’s account, as a
“routine step,” to determine the identity of kelleypatrol.23 The sender
had registered the e-mail account anonymously, requiring investiga-
tors to employ forensic techniques using electronic metadata to deter-
mine the identity of the account owner.24 The FBI compiled a list of
the e-mail accounts accessed from the same Internet Protocol (“IP”)
14. Kurtz, supra note 5.
15. Barton Gellman, Spyfall, TIME (Nov. 15, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/
2012/11/15/spyfall/.
16. Kurtz, supra note 5 (explaining that, allegedly, there were fewer than ten e-mails);
see generally Kelley, supra note 6; (explaining that though the e-mails did not warn Kelley to
stay away from Petraeus, Kelley perceived the e-mails as “increasingly severe, and without
being explicit, threatening”).
17. Kurtz, supra note 5.
18. Id.
19. See Gellman, supra note 15.
20. Mike Carter, Shirtless FBI Agent: Photo Was Joke Emailed to Friends, Reporter, SEATTLE
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2012), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019684905_agent15m
.html?prmid=4939.
21. Sari Horwitz & Kimberly Kindy, Lawmakers Keep Pressing on Petraeus Timeline, DAILY
HERALD (Nov. 17, 2012), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20121117/news/7111798
35/?interstitial=1; see also Gellman, supra note 15.
22. Carter, supra note 20. Humphries brought the situation to U.S. Representative
Dave Reichert, who passed the information on the House Majority Leader Eric Cantor,
who then relayed the message to FBI Director Robert Mueller. Id.
23. See Schmitt & Bumiller, supra note 6.
24. Scott Shane & Charlie Savage, Officials Say F.B.I. Knew of Petraeus Affair in the Sum-
mer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/us-officials-say-
petraeuss-affair-known-in-summer.html?pagewanted=2&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_
20121112&_r=1&.
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address within the same time frame as kelleypatrol.25 Investigators
then crosschecked these account owners against guest lists from hotels
in the various cities from which kelleypatrol accessed the Internet.26
These techniques ultimately revealed Paula Broadwell as the account
owner and sender of the kelleypatrol e-mails.27
The FBI proceeded to search the content of additional e-mail ac-
counts registered under Broadwell’s name, which led to the discovery
of the Gmail account shared by Broadwell and Petraeus.28 Instead of
exchanging e-mails from separate accounts, Broadwell and Petraeus
had shared access to a single account.29 The couple had composed
messages to each other and saved them in a draft folder.30 The con-
tents of the messages suggested that the two were having an affair.31
B. After the Investigation: Consequences for Each Player
The FBI investigation of Broadwell resulted in life-altering conse-
quences for General David Petraeus. On Friday, December 9, 2012,
Petraeus resigned from his role as Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (“CIA”). Petraeus’s resignation came after he admitted to an
extramarital affair with Broadwell—a punishable offense in the mili-
25. Chris Soghoian, Surveillance and Security Lessons from the Petraeus Scandal, ACLU
(Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/sur
veillance-and-security-lessons-petraeus-scandal.
26. Id.
27. Id. Internet service providers, such as Yahoo and Google, keep user IP address
login records for about a year. Id. These records include geolocation data associated with
the user, which can be obtained by U.S. law enforcement with a subpoena. Id. By logging
into other e-mail accounts on the same computer, and consequently the same IP address,
associated with her identity, Broadwell created a data trail by which investigators could
connect the accounts and identify her. Id. She could have taken steps to protect her IP
address, but she sent e-mails from many different hotels, which “decreased the anonymity
set of potential suspects.” Id.; see also Gellman, supra note 15; Shane & Savage, supra note
24.
28. See Richard Lardner, Petraeus Case Shows FBI’s Authority to Read Gmail, Other Email
Services, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/12/
petraeus-fbi-gmail_n_2119319.html (“FBI agents eventually determined that the email trail
led to Broadwell, according to two federal law enforcement officials . . . . As they looked
further, the FBI agents came across a private Gmail account that used an alias name. On
further investigation, the account turned out to be Petraeus’s.”).
29. Soghoian, supra note 25.
30. Id. Some users employ this technique with the belief that it creates a communica-
tion trail that is harder to trace, but “[e]mails saved in a draft folder are stored just like
emails in any other folder in a cloud service, and further, the providers can be compelled,
prospectively, to save copies of everything (so that deleting the messages after reading
them won’t actually stop investigators from getting a copy).” Id.
31. See Soghoian, supra note 25; Lardner, supra note 28.
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tary32—citing it as his reason for stepping down.33 As part of the crimi-
nal investigation into Broadwell, the FBI investigated Petraeus to
determine whether he contributed to Broadwell’s harassing e-mails to
Kelley.34 The government ultimately chose not to file charges against
either Petraeus or Broadwell.35
The investigation also negatively affected Broadwell and her fam-
ily. After the scandal hit newsstands, Broadwell became the center of a
national controversy. Additionally, as part of the investigation into
Broadwell and after the FBI found classified information on Broad-
well’s computer, the government conducted a multi-hour search of
the Broadwell family home in North Carolina.36 Ultimately, the FBI
concluded that no security breach occurred.37 However, the Army
later revoked Broadwell’s promotion from major to lieutenant colo-
nel, pending an internal investigation for wrongdoing.38
Jill Kelley found herself dealing with the fallout of the investiga-
tion almost a year after the scandal. While she declined to press
charges against Broadwell,39 Kelley brought suit against the govern-
ment for invasion of privacy.40 Through the lawsuit, Kelley apparently
hoped to unveil the government actors who leaked her name and e-
mails to the media in the wake of the scandal in late 2012.41 She
claimed that the leaks violated the 1974 Privacy Act,42 the FBI failed to
provide her with the appropriate security protection to which she was
entitled as the victim of a criminal investigation, and the investigation
caused her financial loss.43 Kelley sought monetary damages and an
apology.44
32. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012); United States v. Hickson, 22 M.J. 146 (1986).
33. Epstein, Allen & Gerstein, supra note 1.
34. Lardner, supra note 28.
35. Kurtz, supra note 5.
36. Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., Pam Kelley & Elisabeth Arriero, FBI Agents Search Paula
Broadwell’s Home, MCCLATCHY DC (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/
11/12/174472/fbi-agents-search-home-of-paula.html.
37. Lardner, supra note 28.
38. Barbara Starr, First on CNN: Paula Broadwell Military Promotion Revoked, CNN (Feb.
20, 2013), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/02/20/first-on-cnn-paula-broadwell-mili
tary-promotion-revoked/.
39. Kurtz, supra note 5.
40. Pete Yost, Gov’t Seeks Dismissal of Petraeus-Related Lawsuit, ARMY TIMES (Sept. 24,
2013), http://www.armytimes.com/article/20130924/NEWS/309240042?utm_source=twit
terfeed&utm_medium=twitter.
41. Id.
42. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2012).
43. Yost, supra note 40; 5 U.S.C. §552a(e)(10).
44. Yost, supra note 40.
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Additionally, the search of Kelley’s e-mail account generated seri-
ous consequences for her family friend, FBI Agent Fred Humphries.45
During the investigation, the government uncovered an e-mail com-
munication from Humphries containing a photograph of him shir-
tless, posing between target dummies.46 Humphries captioned the
photograph “Which One’s Fred?” and sent it to Kelley in 2010.47
Agent Humphries asserted that the e-mail was a “tongue-in-cheek”
joke that he sent to dozens of friends and acquaintances and was not
meant to be sexual.48 The FBI also conducted an internal misconduct
probe into Humphries because he raised concerns about improper
FBI interference with the investigation outside FBI channels.49 Hum-
phries claimed that the FBI did not appropriately investigate the kel-
leypatrol e-mails.50
The FBI’s search of Kelley’s e-mail account also created signifi-
cant hardships for General John Allen, the top U.S. Commander in
Afghanistan at the time.51 The search revealed potentially flirtatious e-
mail correspondence between Kelley and Allen.52 Initial reports
45. See Carter, supra note 20.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; Michael Isikoff, Agent Feared FBI Was Stalling Petraeus Investigation Until After
2012 Election, NBC NEWS INVESTIGATIONS BLOG (Nov. 7, 2013), http://investigations.nbc
news.com/_news/2013/11/07/21337699-agent-feared-fbi-was-stalling-petraeus-investiga
tion-until-after-2012-election (explaining that the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility
investigated Humphries for “unauthorized disclosure” of law enforcement information
and that Humphries declined to disclose details regarding the investigation but maintains
that he would handle the matter similarly if it arose again).
50. See Isikoff, supra note 49.
51. See Schmitt & Bumiller, supra note 6 (explaining that when the FBI found flirta-
tious e-mail exchanges between Allen and Kelley, it expanded its investigation to include
these e-mails); Elisabeth Bumiller & Scott Shane, Investigation Into General Narrows Look at E-
Mail, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/28/us/general-allen-
investigation-narrows-focus.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (explaining that the e-mails were
sent by the FBI to the Pentagon on November 11 to determine whether they involved any
offenses under military law, like inappropriate language on a government computer or
adultery and security breaches, by General Allen).
52. See Bumiller & Shane, supra note 51 (explaining that the e-mail correspondence
had not been made public, but law enforcement described some of the e-mails as “sexually
explicit” and “embarrassing,” and that General Allen’s camp refuted these allegations and
argued that the e-mails were “innocuous” and did not say anything “beyond language like
‘you’re a sweetheart’”); William R. Levesque, Jill Kelley Says Some of Gen. Allen’s Emails Were
‘Flirtatious,’ TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.tampabay.com/news/military/
macdill/jill-kelley-says-some-of-gen-allens-emails-were-flirtatious/1275156 (explaining that
Kelley later asserted some of the emails were in fact flirtatious).
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claimed that Kelley and Allen exchanged thousands of e-mails,53 but
the Pentagon later confirmed that it narrowed its focus to “60 to 70 e-
mails that ‘bear a fair amount of scrutiny.’”54 However, the govern-
ment later determined that the correspondence did not reflect a flir-
tatious exchange.55 Not only did this revelation prompt a government
investigation of the commander, it also derailed Allen’s appointment
as NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.56
The consequences for each of these five individuals—stemming
from a single person’s consent to government surveillance—demon-
strate the tremendous loss of privacy exchanged for the pursuit of a
criminal investigation.57 The investigation focused on unveiling
Broadwell’s identity as Jill Kelley’s harasser, yet resulted in severe fall-
out for General Petraeus, General Allen, and FBI Agent Fred Hum-
phries. In particular, General Petraeus committed a largely moral
indiscretion, yet experienced arguably unwarranted consequences, in-
cluding the exposure of his affair, loss of his high-profile position,58
and possibly loss of international respect. The entire group suffered
even though the government ultimately chose not to bring criminal
charges after its investigation of Broadwell.59 In the end, the govern-
ment cleared General Allen,60 as of November 14, 2012, did not take
or anticipate taking further action against FBI Agent Fred Hum-
phries,61 and never suspected Jill Kelley of any wrongdoing.62 The po-
53. Pete Yost & Robert Burns, John Allen-Jill Kelley Emails Were ‘Flirtatious’: Senior Defense
Official, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/13/
john-allen-jill-kelley_n_2122173.html.
54. Bumiller & Shane, supra note 51.
55. See Thom Shanker, Pentagon Clears Commander Over E-Mails, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/us/pentagon-clears-general-allen-over-e-
mails-with-socialite.html?ref=johnrallen.
56. See Bumiller & Shane, supra note 51; Thom Shanker & Michael D. Shear, General
Selected for NATO Post Will Retire, Citing Wife’s Health, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/02/20/us/gen-john-r-allen-nominated-for-nato-post-to-retire.html?ref
=johnrallen&_r=0.
57. See Horwitz & Kindy, supra note 21; Gellman, supra note 15. Investigators claimed
during the initial review of the harassing emails sent to Kelley that the “emails concerned
[them] because they indicated that the sender knew of the travel plans of Petraeus and
Gen. John R. Allen.” Gellman, supra.
58. See Epstein, Allen & Gerstein, supra note 1.
59. Kurtz, supra note 5.
60. Shanker & Shear, supra note 56.
61. Rhonda Schwartz & Jason Ryan, Veteran FBI Agent Frederick Humphries Got Ball Roll-
ing on Petraeus Probe, ABC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/veteran-
fbi-agent-frederick-humphries-ball-rolling-petraeus/story?id=17722771.
62. See Shanker & Shear, supra note 56.
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tential national security concern, which revealed no actual threat,63
was insufficient to justify the loss of privacy suffered by these five indi-
viduals, two of whom were only tangentially related to the original
investigation.
II. Government Surveillance of Electronic Data During the
Broadwell Investigation
The current regulatory scheme in the United States does not ade-
quately check the government’s power to access private information
about an individual without his or her knowledge or consent. Three
instances of government surveillance of electronic data during the in-
vestigation of Paula Broadwell demonstrate the lack of protection the
current legal regime gives the privacy interests at stake. These in-
stances occurred when: (1) Jill Kelley voluntarily offered the contents
of the e-mail in her account to the FBI; (2) the FBI used electronic
metadata to identify Broadwell as the sender of the harassing e-mails;
and (3) the FBI accessed the content of the shared Gmail account of
Broadwell and Petraeus.
Under the current legal regime, government agents must meet
different legal standards to obtain initial clearance to conduct each of
these three types of surveillance.64 These legal standards attempt to
balance a user’s constitutional privacy interest in her electronic data
against law enforcement’s need to conduct criminal investigations.65
An analysis of each incident and an application of the appropriate
legal standard to each demonstrate that the current regime does not
sufficiently protect privacy.
A. Jill Kelley Voluntarily Gives the FBI Access to Her E-mail
Account
At the inception of the scandal, Jill Kelley turned over the string
of harassing e-mails from kelleypatrol to the FBI, as well as access to
her entire e-mail account.66 The FBI sifted through the content of all
e-mails sent or received by Kelley from that account.67
63. Lardner, supra note 28.
64. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1, II.C.1.
65. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend IV.
66. See Kelley, supra note 6. Almost a year after the scandal, Kelley disputed that she
turned over several e-mails to the government and claimed that she and her husband “au-
thorized the FBI to look at one threatening email . . . and only that email, so that the FBI
could identify the stalker.” Id.
67. See id.
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1. Legal Standard
The 1966 Supreme Court case Hoffa v. United States68 provides the
legal standard for when a user voluntarily allows the government to
access her stored e-mail content. The case originally established this
legal standard for when someone voluntarily offers oral information
to the government, but it is now applied similarly to cases involving
electronic information. In Hoffa, a criminal defendant revealed in-
criminating information to a government informant during meetings
in the defendant’s hotel room.69 The government later used this in-
formation against the defendant at trial.70 The defendant argued that
his discussion with the informant in his hotel room was protected by
the Fourth Amendment and therefore must be excluded from use at
trial.71 The Court, however, ultimately determined that no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred.72 It reasoned that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects one from unwarranted government intrusion “when he
places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area,”73 like the defendant’s hotel room. But in this case, the defen-
dant was not relying on the security of his hotel room when he re-
vealed the incriminating information to the informant.74 The
informant did not enter the room surreptitiously, was present with
defendant’s consent, “and every conversation which he heard was ei-
ther directed to him or knowingly carried on in his presence.”75 The
defendant assumed the risk when he relied “upon his misplaced confi-
dence that [the undercover informant] would not reveal his
wrongdoing.”76
Kelley’s situation, in which she voluntarily allowed the govern-
ment access to the content of her stored e-mail, provides an even
stronger example of a user assuming the risk when revealing or hand-
68. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
69. See id. at 296–300.
70. See id. at 295.
71. Id. at 300 (“The argument is that [the informant’s] failure to disclose his role as a
government informer vitiated the consent that the [defendant] gave to [the informant’s]
repeated entries into the suite, and that by listening to the [defendant’s] statements [the
informant] conducted an illegal ‘search’ for verbal evidence.”).
72. Id. at 302.
73. Id. at 301.
74. Id. at 302.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 302–303 (“The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or by an in-
former or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in
the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we
speak.” (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (emphasis added)).
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ing over information to the government. The government did not
secretly gain access to Kelley’s e-mail content without her knowledge.
Instead, Kelley had full awareness that she was giving the information
in her e-mails to a government agency.77 The defendant in Hoffa re-
vealed confidential information to an undercover informant, unaware
that he was speaking to a government actor.78 Kelley, however, main-
tained full knowledge that she gave private information in her e-mail
account to the government.
Moreover, although Kelley provided the information to the gov-
ernment for a specific purpose—to facilitate a criminal investiga-
tion—and the government disclosed the private e-mail content to the
media,79 current law provides Kelley, or any similarly affected third
parties, with no Fourth Amendment protection for such disclosure.80
Kelley knowingly and voluntarily handed her e-mail account over to
the government, assuming the risk that the government would dis-
close its contents to third parties, such as the press.81 This ultimately
resulted in surveillance not only of Jill Kelley, but also of several other
individuals without their consent.82
2. Lack of Protection Offered by Current Regime and Need for
Legislative Change
The government surveillance of Kelley’s stored e-mail content
and disclosure of private information demonstrates the insufficiency
of outdated legal protections for privacy interests and the need for
legislative change. Hoffa involved government surveillance and disclo-
sure of incriminating, yet private, information about a certain individ-
ual, which the individual personally volunteered in the presence of the
77. Kelley, supra note 6; see also Schmitt & Bumiller, supra note 6.
78. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 296–300.
79. See Christina Wilkie, Jill Kelley Sues FBI, Defense Department in Petraeus Scandal, HUF-
FINGTON POST (June 3, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/03/jill-kelley-
sues-fbi-defense_n_3381167.html.
80. See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302. Kelley may have a Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim
against law enforcement for the disclosure of her personal matters to the media since the
disclosure was unrelated to the facilitation of the investigation. The claim would be rela-
tively weak, however, since a similar claim has only been successfully raised in the context
of a person’s privacy interest in medical information. See Doe v. Borough of Barrington,
729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990) (weighing a family’s privacy interest in medical records
against the societal interest in disclosure, and holding that a police officer violated the
family members’ Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights by disclosing the father’s AIDS
virus infection to community members with whom not even casual contact had been
made).
81. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
82. Schmitt & Bumiller, supra note 6; Carter, supra note 20.
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government.83 The private information at stake in Hoffa was cabined
to a single individual,84 whereas the privacy interests at stake during
the Broadwell investigation implicated various individuals: the investi-
gation of Kelley’s e-mails resulted in surveillance of Kelley’s private
life, as well as the private lives of General John Allen and FBI Agent
Fred Humphries.85 The Hoffa standard currently allows for other indi-
viduals to suffer consequences even though they did not consent to
the surveillance.86
The harms experienced by General Allen and FBI Agent Hum-
phries as a result of Kelley’s actions demonstrate a serious need to
update the law. Congress should incorporate into the Stored Commu-
nications Act (“SCA”)87 a provision requiring judicial oversight even if
a person allows law enforcement to search her e-mail content. If the
government gains access to a single e-mail or even several e-mails from
a given account, it should be required to obtain a warrant based on
probable cause88 to access the rest of the e-mails in that account,
rather than be given automatic access to them all. Additionally, in any
given case of electronic surveillance of stored e-mails, the government
should take a cue from the Wiretap Act and give timely notice to the
people surveilled.89 Unless the government files charges against a
surveilled person or leaks the private information to the press, it is
unlikely that the person will ever discover that the surveillance took
place.90 Notice would allow the individual to bring Fourth Amend-
ment claims against the government if he or she believed that the
83. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
84. See id. at 301–02.
85. Schmitt & Bumiller, supra note 6; Carter, supra note 20.
86. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302–03. Because one person’s voluntary disclosure of private
information is not within the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection, the disclosure
of e-mail content reveals communications between the person who disclosed the e-mails
and another person. Therefore, both the person who revealed the e-mail content and the
other person who participated in the e-mail exchange face the risk that the government
will disclose the information in the e-mails to third parties.
87. 18 U.S.C. 121 §§ 2701–12 (2012). The SCA governs when law enforcement seeks
records associated with any user subscribed to an ISP. See infra Parts II.B.1 and II.C.1 for a
detailed outline of the statute’s current protections. At present, there are no statutory safe-
guards in place for a situation in which a person volunteers access to her stored e-mail
content.
88. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the standard for probable cause, which requires
that the government show a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2012) (detailing the provision of the Wiretap Act that
governs surveillance using wiretaps and bugs, which allows judges to order notice to those
implicated by the surveillance even if they are not the target of the investigation).
90. Soghoian, supra note 25.
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surveillance was performed illegally. Such added procedural mecha-
nisms would help to protect the private information of people af-
fected by voluntary e-mail disclosures to law enforcement.91
B. FBI Connects Broadwell to Kelleypatrol
The FBI employed forensic metadata techniques92 to identify
Broadwell as the person responsible for sending harassing e-mails to
Kelley. Investigators searched for e-mail accounts that used the same
IP address as the pseudonymously registered kelleypatrol.93 To find
such e-mail accounts, the FBI requested Internet service providers
(“ISPs”) to produce records listing the IP addresses that reflected the
geographic location from which users had logged in.94 Investigators
then used the geolocation data associated with users’ accounts to
crosscheck against guest lists from hotels in the various cities from
which kelleypatrol accessed the Internet.95 This ultimately revealed
Paula Broadwell as the account owner.96
1. Legal Standard
The SCA governs the process by which law enforcement officials
may obtain records associated with a user subscribed to an ISP such as
Google. The statute provides that an ISP “shall disclose to a govern-
mental entity the . . . telephone or instrument number or other sub-
scriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned
network address”97—among other identifying information—”when
the governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized
91. See infra Part II.C.2.i for responses to concerns regarding giving notice of surveil-
lance in criminal investigations.
92. Soghoian, supra note 25. Broadwell’s account was registered anonymously, requir-
ing investigators to use “forensic techniques—including a check of what other e-mail ac-
counts had been accessed from the same computer address—to identify who was writing
the e-mails.” Id. When Broadwell logged into other e-mail accounts from the same com-
puter she used to access kelleypatrol, Broadwell created a data trail that agents were able to
use to link the accounts. Id. The metadata footprints left by the e-mails were used to deter-
mine the locations from which they were sent. Id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Shane & Savage, supra note 24; Gellman, supra note 15.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2012). Under the statute, other information the govern-
ment can obtain from an ISP with a subpoena includes a subscriber’s “name; . . . ad-
dress; . . . local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session
times and durations; . . . length of service (including start date) and types of service uti-
lized; and . . . means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or
bank account number) . . . .” Id.
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by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial
subpoena . . . .”98 The statute further provides that the “governmental
entity receiving the records or information under this subsection is
not required to provide notice to a subscriber or customer.”99 To ac-
quire records of the IP addresses and geolocation data associated with
a user’s account—like the records used to identify Broadwell as kel-
leypatrol—the SCA requires only that law enforcement obtain an ad-
ministrative subpoena.100 But because the FBI has the ability to issue
the subpoena, the procedure requires no judicial oversight,101 which
leaves an immense amount of unchecked power in the hands of the
FBI.
2. Lack of Protection Offered by Current Regime and Need for
Legislative Change
The procedural requirements in the SCA provide little to no pro-
tection for users’ non-content ISP records, which can contain identify-
ing information. The Broadwell investigation brings to light the need
for heightened statutory safeguards for non-content subscriber
records: investigators obtained identifying and geolocation informa-
tion related to users’ accounts without any judicial oversight.102 This
power allowed the FBI to cull through private information and iden-
tify Broadwell without any mechanism to hold it accountable for its
techniques.103 The search also involved the surveillance of other sub-
scribers who had logged onto the Internet from the same IP address
as kelleypatrol.104 Because the statute does not require the govern-
ment to notify these users,105 the users will never know about the sur-
veillance and therefore never be able to claim it was unlawful.106
Without meaningful judicial oversight (e.g., requiring a judge to re-
view and approve the administrative subpoena seeking the geoloca-
tion data at issue in the Broadwell investigation) the government
maintains practically unchecked access to non-content ISP records.
Unbridled access means a significant loss of control over information
98. Id.
99. Id. § 2703(c)(3).
100. See id. § 2703(c)(2).
101. See id.; Soghoian, supra note 25.
102. Soghoian, supra note 25.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(3).
106. See Soghoian, supra note 25.
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about oneself, especially in combination with present-day investigative
techniques.
To create a check against potential abuse, Congress should ad-
dress this issue by amending the SCA to require independent review
of an administrative subpoena sought by investigators under these cir-
cumstances. It should also require timely notice to those surveilled in
this manner.107 Without such notice, the target of the subpoena will
likely never learn that the government obtained personally identifi-
able data.108
C. FBI Searches Broadwell and Petraeus’s Shared Gmail Account
Once the FBI determined Broadwell’s identity, it searched
through the content of all the e-mail accounts associated with her
name, including the Gmail account she shared with General Pe-
traeus.109 The content of the saved e-mail drafts in the account re-
vealed the couple’s extramarital affair.110
1. Legal Standard
Section 2703(c) of the SCA governs law enforcement requests for
the content of stored e-mail communications.111 According to the
SCA, a stored communication is “any temporary, intermediate storage
of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof”112 and “any storage of such communication by
an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protec-
tion of such communication.”113 In other words, stored communica-
tions include a user’s received e-mails, sent emails, and saved e-mail
drafts that are stored with an ISP.114 The statute provides that the gov-
ernment may compel an ISP to disclose the content of e-mail commu-
nications in electronic storage for 180 days or less115 only pursuant to
107. See id.; infra Part II.C.2.i (responding to concerns regarding giving notice of sur-
veillance in criminal investigations).
108. See Soghoian, supra note 25 (explaining that targets typically never learn of surveil-
lance unless charges are filed or government officials leak details to the press).
109. See id.
110. Lardner, supra note 28.
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (2012).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) (2012).
113. Id. § 2510(17)(B).
114. See Surveillance Self-Defense Project, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://web.archive
.org/web/20140818194417/https://ssd.eff.org/3rdparties/protect/email-inbox (accessed
through the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine) (snapshot taken on Aug. 18, 2014).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
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a court-issued warrant.116 However, if a communication is in storage
for more than 180 days and the government wishes to gain access to
the communication, the government can either (1) obtain a warrant
or (2) obtain a court order or subpoena and give notice to the user.117
Though the government must give notice to a user if it obtains a court
order or subpoena, the notice may be significantly delayed under cer-
tain circumstances.118 The government’s interpretation of the SCA does
not require law enforcement agents to obtain a warrant to search
opened e-mails, sent e-mails, or e-mails saved in the drafts box.119 Ac-
cording to the government, these types of communications are not
considered to be in “electronic storage” as defined by the SCA.120
Therefore, regardless of the age of the communication, it does not
qualify for warrant protection.121
Should the government need to obtain a warrant to compel dis-
closure of a stored communication, however, it must make a showing
of “probable cause to search for and seize a person or property or to
install and use a tracking device.”122 The probable cause standard re-
quires a magistrate judge to decide if, “given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.”123 Whether the FBI obtained a warrant to gain access to the
content of the shared Gmail account in the Broadwell investigation
116. Id.
117. Id. § 2703(a)–(b).
118. Id.; see also infra Part II.C.2.i (explaining that notice can be delayed up to ninety
days if certain circumstances are present).
119. Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56
ALA. L. REV. 9, 57 (2004) (explaining that Department of Justice manuals indicate that the
government groups opened e-mails with those in long-term storage, i.e., older than 180
days, and that according to the SCA, agents need not obtain a warrant to access e-mails in
long-term storage); Hanni Fakhoury et al., When Will Our Email Betray Us? An Email Privacy
Primer in Light of the Petraeus Scandal, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 14, 2012), https://www
.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/11/when-will-our-email-betray-us-email-privacy-primer-light-petra
eus-saga (describing how the government believes the warrant requirement only applies to
unopened e-mail and stating that “[t]he DOJ would likely consider draft messages as
‘opened’ email,” as well); Surveillance Self-Defense Project, supra note 114 (“[U]nder the gov-
ernment’s interpretation of the term ‘electronic storage’, the emails that arrive in your
inbox lose warrant protection under the [SCA], and are obtainable with nothing more
than a subpoena . . . as soon as you’ve downloaded, opened or otherwise viewed them.
Similarly, the government believes that it can obtain the sent emails and draft emails that
you store with your provider with only a subpoena . . . .”).
120. Surveillance Self-Defense Project, supra note 114.
121. See id. But cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (detailing how a warrant is necessary to
obtain an e-mail communication that is in electronic storage and less than180 days old).
122. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1) (2013).
123. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
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remains unclear.124 However, if the government did acquire a war-
rant, it has not been transparent about the factual predicate justifying
the search.
2. Lack of Protection Offered by Current Regime and Need for
Legislative Change
The government’s surveillance of Broadwell and Petraeus’s
shared Gmail account demonstrates a significant lack of procedural
safeguards. In addition to requiring a warrant for access to stored e-
mail content, procedural safeguards can ensure government account-
ability and transparency in the surveillance of stored e-mail content.
In particular, four inadequacies in the current law call attention to the
need for enhanced procedural safeguards for the surveillance of
stored e-mail content: (1) lack of notice to the target; (2) no minimi-
zation of non-incriminating e-mail content searched; (3) no particu-
larity requirement in the warrant application; and (4) the sealing of
the court record and docket. Each inadequacy will be addressed in
turn.
i. Notice
The SCA explicitly provides that the target of a search need not
be notified if the government obtains a warrant to compel the content
of stored e-mail communications older than 180 days.125 Lack of no-
tice raises significant privacy concerns. Notice provides a target with
124. See E-mail from Susan Freiwald, Professor, University of San Francisco School of
Law (Mar. 7, 2013, 1:14 PM EST) (on file with author) (explaining that Chris Soghoian,
Principal Technologist and Senior Policy Analyst, ACLU Speech, Privacy and Technology
Project, contacted the District Court handling the investigation to inquire whether the
government had obtained a warrant and was told that the files were sealed); compare Evan
Perez, Siobhan Gorman & Devlin Barrett, FBI Scrutinized on Petraeus, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324073504578113460852395852
.html (“[The agents] used metadata footprints left by the emails to determine what loca-
tions they were sent from. They matched the places, including hotels, where Ms. Broadwell
was during the times the emails were sent. FBI agents and federal prosecutors used the
information as probable cause to seek a warrant to monitor Ms. Broadwell’s email ac-
counts.”), with Rick Rothacker & David Ingram, Identity of Second Woman Emerges in Petraeus’
Downfall, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/12/us-usa-
petraeus-idUSBRE8A81FP20121112 (“[A] U.S. government official said the FBI investiga-
tion into the emails was fairly straightforward and did not require obtaining court orders to
monitor the email accounts of those involved, including the personal email account of
Petraeus.”), and Fakhoury et al., supra note 119 (speculating that Google required the gov-
ernment obtain a warrant to compel disclosure of the stored e-mail content).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (2012); see also Freiwald, supra note 119 (explaining that
because the government groups opened e-mails with e-mails in long-term storage (older
than 180 days), the opened e-mails are subject to the same lack of notice provision);
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knowledge of the surveillance and consequently allows her to defend
her rights.126 Assume the government obtained a warrant based on
probable cause to search the content of the drafts in Broadwell and
Petraeus’s shared Gmail account; current law would not have required
investigators to notify Broadwell of such surveillance. If the govern-
ment opted to use a court order or subpoena to gain access to the
content, the SCA would have required that the government give no-
tice of the surveillance.127 According to the statute, however, such no-
tice can be delayed for up to ninety days if certain circumstances are
present.128 To delay notice, the law requires the government to show
that it has reason to believe that notice would create an adverse result
that would interrupt the ongoing criminal investigation.129 An adverse
result can be “endangering the life or physical safety of an individ-
ual; . . . flight from prosecution; . . . destruction of or tampering with
evidence; . . . intimidation of potential witnesses; or . . . otherwise
seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.”130
The government commenced its investigation into Broadwell in
June 2012, but assume it did not notify Broadwell of the surveillance
at that time, obtained a ninety-day extension, and interviewed Broad-
well in September 2012.131 If this September interview served as
Broadwell’s first notice of the electronic surveillance on her e-mail
accounts, it occurred more than ninety days after the government ob-
tained a warrant, court order, or subpoena.132 At this point, it was too
late for her to challenge any unlawful search of her private content
before it happened.133 This instance reflects two deficiencies in the
Fakhoury et al., supra note 119 (explaining that the government likely considers draft
messages to be opened e-mail).
126. Susan Freiwald & Sylvain Me´tille, Reforming Surveillance Law: The Swiss Model, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1261, 1299 (2013).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b).
128. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b)(2)(B), 2705 (2012).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 2705.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 2795(a)(2) (2012).
131. Fakhoury et al., supra note 119.
132. Because of conflicting reports regarding the date of the initiation of the investiga-
tion into Broadwell and the date of her first interview, this assumption illustrates the func-
tionality of the delayed notice section in the SCA and how, practically, most targets do not
learn of electronic surveillance of their e-mail content. Compare id., with Timeline of the Pe-
traeus Affair, CNN POLITICS (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/12/politics/
petraeus-timeline/.
133. Additionally, while the government eventually notified Broadwell and Petraeus of
the search conducted on their shared Gmail account, many innocent citizens never learn
of electronic surveillance of their e-mail content. See Stephen W. Smith, Gagged, Sealed &
Delivered, 6 HARV. L. POL’Y REV. 313, 315 (2012); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communi-
cations Privacy, STANFORD TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 62–63 (2007).
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SCA’s current notice provision. First, if the government used a court
order or subpoena to search the Gmail account and got the ninety-day
extension, it is clear that law enforcement would not be held account-
able for failing to give notice as soon as the extension expired. Sec-
ond, none of the enumerated “adverse results” were present to justify
delaying notice to Broadwell. In a criminal investigation of a member
of the military who allegedly sent harassing e-mails, timely notice
would not have risked the intimidation or death of a witness, flight of
prosecution, or destruction of evidence.134 Again, because the practi-
cal effect of electronic surveillance in the stored communications con-
text involves government access to communications before the user
receives notice of such access, there is no risk of the user destroying
the evidence.135
Admittedly, at least “some measure of temporary secrecy for elec-
tronic surveillance orders during a criminal investigation is both rea-
sonable and necessary,”136 but SCA surveillance orders consistently
remain undetected by the target until long after the close of the inves-
tigation.137 To date, only Jill Kelley has asserted that the government
unlawfully searched her e-mail,138 but Broadwell’s case demonstrates
the difficulty a target may face in defending his or her Fourth Amend-
ment rights against potentially unlawful electronic surveillance during
a criminal investigation. Currently, surveillance of most stored e-mail
content requires, at most, significantly delayed notice to the target.
In order to properly protect people’s rights, Congress should in-
clude a blanket, non-delayed notice provision in the SCA. While still
accommodating law enforcement’s needs, Congresswoman Zoe Lof-
gren139 has set forth an effective proposal.140 She suggests notice be
134. Assuming investigators were concerned that Broadwell was privy to confidential
information from Petraeus, they had already obtained her communications from ISPs;
also, Broadwell willingly allowed the government to search her home and computer files
during the investigation. See Wootson, Kelley & Arriero, supra note 36.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (2012).
136. Smith, supra note 133, at 315 (“Premature disclosure to the target or the general
public could jeopardize the integrity of the ongoing investigation and encourage the target
to flee or destroy evidence.”).
137. Id. (“[Because surveillance orders remain sealed almost indefinitely], unless the
investigation results in criminal charges, targets who are law-abiding citizens will never
learn that the government has accessed their emails, text messages, twitter accounts, or cell
phone records.”); United States. v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (2010) (explaining that
police got one ninety-day delay of notice extension, but Warshak did not get notice of e-
mail surveillance until a year after it occurred).
138. Kelley, supra note 6.
139. Biography of Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren California, 19th District, CONGRESSWOMAN
ZOE LOFGREN, http://www.lofgren.house.gov/biography/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
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given by serving targets with a copy of the warrant within three days
after law enforcement has accessed the content.141 However, this
change would be subject to the existing notice delays in the statute.142
To strike a more equitable balance between law enforcement needs
and privacy interests, extension request applications should be partic-
ularized and set forth a specific time period for delay of notice, which
law enforcement must strictly follow.143
ii. Minimization
The Wiretap Act,144 which governs wiretaps and bugs, requires
that investigators using these techniques “minimize the interception
of communications not otherwise subject to interception.”145 Practi-
cally, this statutory language requires investigators to conduct the in-
vestigation in a manner that minimizes the surveillance of non-
incriminating information.146 For instance, in the traditional wiretap
context, investigators must terminate the tap as soon as the surveilled
conversation turns to a non-incriminating subject.147 The statutory
language ensures that investigators are held accountable to a judge
for conducting their investigation in this manner.148 The SCA does
not have similar language to require such minimization in the surveil-
lance of stored electronic communications. However, according to the
Honorable James G. Garr, incorporating a minimization requirement
would fulfill “the constitutional obligation of avoiding, to the greatest
possible extent, seizure of conversations which have no relationship to
the crimes being investigated or the purpose for which electronic sur-
veillance has been authorized.”149 As in the traditional wiretap con-
text, minimization in the stored communications context would
include judicial oversight of the minimization efforts and ensure that
investigators are held accountable for conducting their investigations
in a manner that limits the surveillance of non-incriminating informa-
140. H.R. 983, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
113hr983ih/pdf/BILLS-113hr983ih.pdf; 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2) (2012).
141. H.R. 983.
142. Id.
143. Smith, supra note 133, at 332.
144. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
146. Urge Congress to Stop the FBI’s Use of Privacy-Invading Software, ACLU, https://www
.aclu.org/urge-congress-stop-fbis-use-privacy-invading-software (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
147. Jeff Strange, A Primer on Wiretaps, Pen Registers, and Trap and Trace Devices, TEX.
DIST. & CNTY. ATTORNEYS ASS’N (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.tdcaa.com/node/4813.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)–(6).
149. JAMES G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 5.7(a), at 5–28 (1994).
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tion. For instance, a judge’s order authorizing surveillance of stored
communications could require investigators to report to the judge the
progress made toward the authorized objective and the need for con-
tinued surveillance.150
In theory, the interception of communications in transit, such as
a real time phone conversation, can be distinguished from the surveil-
lance of stored e-mail communications.151 “[O]fficers cannot know in
advance, which, if any, of the intercepted communications will be rele-
vant to the crime under investigation, and often will have to obtain
access to the contents of communications in order to make such a
determination.”152 Thus, “[i]nterception . . . poses a significant risk
that officers will obtain access to communications which have no rele-
vance to the investigation they are conducting.”153 In contrast, such
risk can be controlled during the surveillance of stored electronic
communications. Investigators may use keyword searches to locate rel-
evant communications “without the necessity of reviewing the entire
contents of all of the stored communications.”154
However, the Broadwell investigation demonstrates the insuffi-
ciency of relying on law enforcement to minimize the surveillance of
non-incriminating content without independent oversight or external
regulations. As a result of the FBI’s investigation to identify Broadwell
as the sender of harassing e-mails to Jill Kelley, investigators searched
and disclosed to the public e-mail conversations of three additional,
unrelated individuals.155 FBI Agent Fred Humphries, General John Al-
len, and General David Petraeus suffered significant repercussions
stemming from the government’s surveillance of the stored e-mail
content during its investigation of Paula Broadwell.156 The govern-
ment could have used keyword searches to locate relevant communi-
cations and narrow its search, but the e-mails disclosed to the public
with subject matter unrelated to protecting classified information157
illustrate that the government either (1) did not use keyword searches
or (2) used keyword searches and failed to sufficiently self-govern the
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6).
151. Steve Jackson Games v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 1994).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra Parts I.A.–B.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 20. For example, the content of the e-mail sent to Jill
Kelley from FBI Agent Fred Humphries was clearly unrelated to the investigation into
Broadwell. The content of the e-mail included a picture of Humphries posed between a
pair of target dummies captioned “Which One’s Fred?” Id.
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results of those searches. A statutory minimization requirement would
explicitly require the government to conduct the surveillance using
methods to minimize the interception of communications irrelevant
to the authorized objective,158 such as keyword searching, and also
incorporate a judicial oversight mechanism to ensure adequate pro-
tection of private information. Investigators would be held accounta-
ble to this standard by an independent judge, who could require
reports during the investigation showing progress made toward the
authorized objective and the need for continued surveillance.159
Congress rationalizes the minimization requirement in the wire-
tap context through the indiscriminate nature of the surveillance.160
However, the surveillance of stored e-mail content, while not inter-
cepted in real time like wiretap surveillance, proves to be just as indis-
criminate. Where e-mails can contain a bevy of information unrelated
to the criminal investigation, surveillance of a target’s conversations
inevitably results in the surveillance of innocent people and activities
unrelated to the investigation’s purpose.161 Additionally, when the
government’s initial “routine step” in an investigation involves search-
ing all the e-mails in an account,162 information unrelated to the in-
vestigation will inevitably be disclosed.
Like the Wiretap Act, the SCA should incorporate a minimization
requirement to protect against the risk of the government gaining ac-
cess to non-incriminating stored electronic communications. Con-
gress should require that surveillance of stored e-mail content be
conducted in a manner that minimizes the surveillance of communi-
cations unrelated to the target and subject matter of the authorized
158. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2012).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2518; see also Freiwald, supra note 119, ¶ 67 (explaining how indiscrim-
inate investigations implicate the core concerns of the Fourth Amendment) (“If law en-
forcement agents must intrude upon private activities to perform their jobs, the harm from
intrusion is minimized to the extent the investigation reaches no further than necessary to
uncover incriminating evidence.”).
161. See Freiwald, supra note 119, ¶¶ 66, 68 (“Stored e-mails contain a vast archive of
people’s past activities. . . . Because of the extra richness of e-mails as compared to tele-
phone conversations, there is every reason to believe that e-mail surveillance will be just as
indiscriminate . . . In the Warshak case, the plaintiff claims that government agents ac-
quired thousands of his personal e-mails, ‘without particularization or limitation as to time
frame, parties to the communication, or the subject matter of the communication.’ Surveil-
lance that may acquire information unrelated to the search justification requires judicial
intervention to ensure that acquisition of non-incriminating communications is
minimized.”).
162. Schmitt & Bumiller, supra note 6.
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objective of the original investigation.163 For example, investigators
would be statutorily required to use methods such as keyword search-
ing and immediately terminate searching an email once they deter-
mine it is unrelated to the subject matter of the investigation, even if
that means only through reading the title. The surveillance should
also be required to terminate upon attainment of the authorized ob-
jective.164 Additionally, Congress should demand annual reports dis-
closing the percentage of surveilled stored e-mail conversations that
end up being incriminating.165 Such reports should be published an-
nually to allow the public to understand the electronic surveillance
undertaken by the government and ensure that the government does
not abuse its power.166 This mechanism will correct for the indiscrimi-
nate nature of stored communication surveillance.167
iii. Particularity
Currently, the government’s application for a warrant under the
SCA does not require any showing of particularity.168 The SCA re-
quires that the government obtain “a warrant issued using the proce-
dures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . ,”169
which in turn requires that the warrant “identify the person or prop-
erty to be searched [or] identify any person or property to be
163. For instance, if the government is authorized to search e-mail exchanges in Jill
Kelley’s e-mail account and the authorized objective of the surveillance is to identify Broad-
well as the sender of harassing e-mails to Jill Kelley, the subject matter of the e-mail content
searched by investigators should not exceed those bounds.
164. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2012) (providing a minimization requirement for
the interception of live wire, oral, or electronic communications).
165. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2519(2) (2012) (requiring that prosecutors and judges pro-
vide information for an annual report on wiretapping); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, WIRETAP REPORT (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Wiretap
Reports/wiretap-report-2012.aspx#saz; CHRISTOPHER SOGHOIAN, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
SURVEILLANCE REPORTING GAP 6 (2011), http://www.digitallymediatedsurveillance.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/Soghoian-Surveillance-reporting.pdf (“The reports are ex-
tremely detailed, and for each wiretap, reveals the city or county, the kind of intercep-
tion . . . the number of individuals whose communications were intercepted, the number
of intercepted messages, the number of arrests and convictions that resulted from the in-
terception, as well as the financial cost of the wiretap. . . . [However], there are no official
statistics regarding law enforcement acquisition of stored communications data.”).
166. See, e.g., SOGHOIAN, supra note 165, at 6 (“The Administrative Office of the Courts
has published reports for the years 1997 to the present. By comparing these reports, sev-
eral interesting trends can be seen regarding the use of [ ] [wiretap] surveillance power by
federal and state law enforcement agencies.” (citation omitted)).
167. Freiwald, supra note 133, ¶ 67.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
169. 18 U.S.C. §2703(a).
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seized . . . .”170 A particularity requirement would require the govern-
ment to give a detailed request for the surveillance of stored e-mail
content. For instance, a warrant application in the Broadwell case
would have required the government to identify a particularized time
frame, specify a target or targeted individuals, and indicate the subject
matter of the communication sought. Consequently, such a specific
warrant would have limited the search within those boundaries. Be-
cause e-mail content contains a wealth of personal information,171 the
particularity requirement would have meaningfully narrowed the
scope of the warrant application and protected unrelated private in-
formation from surveillance. Under current law, the SCA would not
have required a warrant application in the Broadwell investigation to
be particularized. If a warrant was issued in the Broadwell investiga-
tion, the SCA would have only obligated the government to establish
probable cause172 and broadly state a desire to conduct electronic sur-
veillance of Broadwell’s e-mails.173 Thus, if a warrant was in fact se-
cured in this case, the lack of particularization with respect to time
frame and subject matter would have allowed investigators to search e-
mails unrelated to the investigation174—as was ultimately the result.
The SCA must require the government to explain with particular-
ity the information sought in its surveillance of stored e-mail content.
Congress should amend the statute to require law enforcement to
specify the target, parties to the communication, subject matter, and
particular time frame within which the e-mails were sent, received, or
initially drafted. Such particularity mechanisms will narrow the scope
of the warrant, allowing investigators to search e-mail content while
protecting unrelated people and content from electronic surveillance.
170. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A).
171. Freiwald, supra note 133, ¶ 66 (“A simple e-mail message has textual header infor-
mation that discloses the time it was composed, its subject line plus any attachments, and
the electronic addresses of the sender, the recipient, and any who receive courtesy copies
of it. E-mails often include prior messages in their text, and analysis may reveal the com-
puter on which the e-mail was composed, its path through the network, and the times the
e-mail was opened, deleted, or forwarded. Moreover, people reveal in their e-mails more
about their political opinions, religious beliefs, personal relationships, intellectual inter-
ests, and artistic endeavors than they ever revealed over the telephone.”).
172. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d).
173. Fakhoury et al., supra note 119 (noting that warrants are often “quite broad,” and
the government may well have obtained e-mails from all of Broadwell’s accounts under a
single warrant).
174. For example, they could have reviewed unrelated e-mail content, like the drafts
between Broadwell and Petraeus that revealed their extramarital affair. See Soghoian, supra
note 25; Lardner, supra note 28; Fakhoury et al., supra note 119 (“As a result [of the broad
warrant], there’s no telling how much email the FBI actually read.”).
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iv. Sealing Court Records
Courts presently keep the majority of electronic surveillance or-
ders and related court orders permanently sealed.175 While the SCA
does not contain a provision for automatically sealing court
records,176 the government often groups these orders with other elec-
tronic surveillance orders (e.g., orders for wiretaps, pen registers, and
trap and trace devices) that require automatic sealing.177 Combining
the orders results in an automatic seal for all of the electronic surveil-
lance involved.178 This practice prevents the public from scrutinizing
what judges permit the government to review.179 Unsealing electronic
surveillance court records would equip targets with knowledge to pro-
tect their rights, and such procedural transparency would help hold
the government accountable for its investigation methods.180
The Broadwell investigation provides a prime example of how a
lack of procedural transparency prevents the public from holding the
government accountable for its electronic surveillance methods. As
stated, the court sealed its records in the investigation, and it remains
unknown whether investigators obtained a warrant to search Broad-
well’s e-mails.181 Even if the government did obtain a warrant, sealing
court records prevents the public from knowing the warrant’s factual
predicate. Disclosing the warrant’s factual predicate would allow the
public to evaluate, scrutinize, and challenge the application of the law
175. Smith, supra note 133, at 321. Smith, a Magistrate Judge in the Southern District
of Texas, estimated that in 2006, magistrate judges issued more than 30,000 sealed elec-
tronic surveillance orders. Id. “To put this figure in context, magistrate judges in one year
generated a volume of secret electronic surveillance cases more than thirty times the an-
nual number of FISA cases; in fact, this volume of ECPA cases is greater than the combined
yearly total of all antitrust, employment discrimination, environmental, copyright, patent,
trademark, and securities cases filed in federal court.” Id. at 322.
176. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).
177. Smith, supra note 133, at 325.
178. See id. (“[T]he secrecy provisions of the SCA are less stringent than other forms of
ECPA surveillance such as wiretaps or pen registers. The default rule is that a 2703(d)
order will not be sealed, nor will it be accompanied by a gag order absent a showing of one
of the special circumstances listed in 2705(b). However, in many districts the government
routinely avoids these weaker SCA secrecy provisions by the simple expedient of combin-
ing its request for a 2703(d) order and a pen/trap order into a single application and
order. The combined order is then automatically sealed and gagged by the authority of the
Pen/Trap Statute. Although [the statutes governing wiretap, pen and trap devices, and
stored communications] do not contemplate such combined orders, no published court
opinion has challenged the practice.”).
179. Id. at 333.
180. Id. at 335–36.
181. See E-mail from Susan Freiwald, supra note 124.
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governing surveillance of stored e-mail content.182 Without open
records, no meaningful discourse can take place regarding the proce-
dures governing such electronic surveillance.
To achieve sufficient procedural transparency in criminal investi-
gations and hold law enforcement accountable to the public, Con-
gress must require courts to open records to public scrutiny.183 The
SCA should require judges to separately scrutinize and issue orders
involving surveillance of stored communications to close the loophole
that allows SCA orders to take advantage of the Wiretap Act and Pen/
Trap Statute automatic sealing provisions.184 Congress should then in-
corporate a provision in the Wiretap Act (as amended by ECPA),
Pen/Trap Statute, and SCA requiring that court orders and records
not be sealed unless the public nature of the court records poses a
threat to law enforcement’s legitimate ability to conduct an effective
investigation. When that is the case, the government may request that
the court issue a sealing order if it explains in detail the necessity for
sealing the records and why more narrow alternatives or redaction
cannot solve the problem. Also, courts should set a time limit for lift-
ing the seal when the justification ceases to exist.185
3. Effective United States Law
While the current legal regime does not offer sufficient procedu-
ral safeguards, the Broadwell investigation reveals that ISPs may pro-
vide an effective check on the government. ISPs generally require the
government to obtain and present a warrant to acquire stored e-mail
content.186 In fact, many speculate that Google itself, rather than the
law, forced the government to obtain a warrant to gain access to
182. Smith, supra note 133, at 333 (“The public has no way to evaluate, much less have
confidence in, sealed court orders. From the standpoint of the ordinary citizen, electronic
surveillance is among the most intrusive governmental activities a court can authorize, yet
it is also the most likely to be hidden from public view.”).
183. Id.
184. Id. (“Congress should amend ECPA to eliminate automatic sealing for electronic
surveillance applications, orders, and docket sheets. This is already the law regarding
docket sheets in general.”).
185. See id.
186. Fakhoury et al., supra note 119; Who Has Your Back?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2014 (last visited Aug. 19, 2014). Google, as well as
Adobe, Amazon, Apple, Dropbox, Facebook, Foursquare, Internet Archive, LinkedIn,
Lookout, Microsoft, MySpace, Pinterest, Sonic.net, Spideroak, Tumblr, Twitter, Verizon,
Wicker, Wikimedia Foundation, Wordpress, and Yahoo!, require a warrant for stored con-
tent. Who Has Your Back?, supra. The Electronic Frontier Foundation charts companies that
protect user data from the government and the extent of such protections. See id.
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Broadwell’s Gmail account.187 When ISPs push back on the govern-
ment, the protection of e-mail content dramatically increases.188
ISPs are currently performing a role traditionally played by the
legal regime to protect Fourth Amendment rights. While citizens
should appreciate ISPs’ efforts to check the government’s surveillance
power, they cannot depend on them for a long-term, comprehensive,
and permanent solution.189 Some companies still do not require a
warrant for user content,190 and Google’s policy, for instance, could
be transitory.191 The company’s legal team has voiced privacy con-
187. David Drummond, Google’s Approach to Government Requests for User Data, GOOGLE:
OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 27, 2013), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/googles-ap-
proach-to-government-requests.html. Google’s Chief Legal Officer David Drummond offi-
cially announced the leading ISP’s company policy in early 2012: “We require that
government agencies conducting criminal investigations use a search warrant to compel us
to provide a user’s search query information and private content stored in a Google Ac-
count—such as Gmail messages, documents, photos and YouTube videos. We believe a
warrant is required by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits
unreasonable search and seizure and overrides conflicting provisions in ECPA.” Id.; see also
Fakhoury et al., supra note 119.
188. See Drummond, supra note 187; Fakhoury et al., supra note 119. Additionally, Rich-
ard Salgado, Google’s Director for Information Security and Law Enforcement, is actively
pursuing changes to the current statutory requirements covering stored e-mail content.
Salgado maintains that the “inconsistent, confusing and uncertain standards” surrounding
the electronic surveillance of stored email communications “reveal how ECPA fails to pre-
serve the reasonable privacy expectations of Americans today.” Written Testimony of Rich-
ard Salgado, Senior Counsel, Law Enforcement and Information Security, Google, Inc.,
House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, Hear-
ing on “ECPA and the Cloud” 3 (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://static.googleusercon
tent.com/external_content/untrusted_dlcp/www.google.com/en/us/googleblogs/pdfs/
google_testimony_rick_salgado.pdf; see also Who Has Your Back?, supra note 186 (stating
that, in addition to Google, companies such as Apple, Credo Mobile, Dropbox, Facebook,
Internet Archive, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Pinterest, Sonic.net, Spideroak, Tumblr, Twitter,
Verizon, Wicker, Wikimedia Foundation, Wordpress, and Yahoo!, “fight for their users’
privacy interests in Congress”).
189. See Fakhoury et al., supra note 119 (“In EFF’s experience, the government will seek
a warrant rather than litigate the issue.”).
190. Who Has Your Back?, supra note 186. Some influential companies, such as AT&T,
Comcast, and Snapchat, do not require a warrant for user content. Id.
191. As Director of Google’s Law Enforcement and Information Security team, Rich-
ard Salgado leads the effort on the ISP’s protection of user information. If Salgado were to
leave Google, his transparency philosophy and policy could arguably leave with him. Drum-
mond, supra note 187; Written Testimony of Richard Salgado, Director, Law Enforcement
and Information Security, Google, Inc., House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terror-
ism, Homeland Security and Investigations, Hearing on “ECPA Part I: Lawful Access to
Stored Content” (Mar. 19, 2013), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/
113th/03192013_2/Salgado%2003192013.pdf (“I oversee the company’s response to gov-
ernment requests for user information . . . .”).
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cerns192 while Richard Salgado193 heads up the Information Security
and Law Enforcement team, but the future of stored e-mail protection
requires statutory safeguards, which provide relatively permanent,
clear, and specific guidelines that will outlast any one senior counsel
and will apply across all companies, not just Google.
Conclusion
The Broadwell investigation highlights the lack of procedural
safeguards afforded by current statutes and effective law for stored e-
mail content during a criminal investigation. The fallout of such sur-
veillance can be dire, even for those who are not the target of the
investigation. The current regime does not sufficiently protect the pri-
vacy interests at stake, as illustrated by the disproportionate conse-
quences suffered by the people involved in the Petraeus scandal.
Congress must update the SCA to: (1) provide notice to the target; (2)
include a minimization requirement protecting non-incriminating e-
mail content; (3) offer a particularity requirement in the govern-
ment’s warrant application; and (4) unseal court records pertaining
to stored email communications. Through these enhanced procedu-
ral safeguards, Congress can strike the desired balance between law
enforcement’s need to exercise legitimate electronic surveillance and
citizens’ privacy and autonomy interests in stored e-mail content.
192. See Drummond, supra note 187; Written Testimony of Richard Salgado, supra note
188; Written Testimony of Richard Salgado, supra note 190.
193. Biography of Richard Salgado, CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y, http://cyberlaw.stan
ford.edu/about/people/richard-salgado (last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
